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5(Un)Making the Boundaries of Environmental
Law Scholarship: Interdisciplinarity Beyond the
Social Sciences?
margherita pieraccini
1 Introduction: Interdisciplinarity and Environmental Law
Scholarship
Despite its recent origins, public international law has developed at
great speed to solve and react to current environmental crises.
Academics interested in the subject have had little time to reﬂect on
the identity and boundaries of the subject. As Fisher et al. argue,1 it is
time for environmental law academics to pause and begin an internal
reﬂection on their academic subject. This call has been taken up by
some scholars, who have discussed the (lack of) coherence of envir-
onmental law scholarship2 and the challenges arising from its per-
ceived interdisciplinarity.3
This chapter contributes to these existing critical reﬂections by focus-
ing on the problematic relationship between natural sciences and envir-
onmental law scholarship. To explore this relationship, it focuses on two
key challenges: institutional and epistemological, which confront the
growth of an interdisciplinary agenda aimed at bringing natural sciences
and environmental law scholarship together.
1 Elizabeth Fisher et al., ‘Maturity andMethodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental
Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 213.
2 Ole Pedersen, ‘Modest Pragmatic Lessons for a Diverse and Incoherent Environmental
Law’ (2013) 33Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 103; Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
& Victoria Brooks (eds.), Research Methods in Environmental Law: A Handbook
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017).
3 See, for example, Ole Pedersen, ‘The Limits of Interdisciplinarity and the Practice of
Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2014) 26 Journal of Environmental Law 423;
Dave Owen & Caroline Noblet, ‘Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law’
(2015) 41 Ecology Law Quarterly 887.
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As a starting point, it should be stated that there is not a uniﬁed
version of what environmental law is and this of course has repercus-
sions on the way a critique of the discipline and its relationship to
natural sciences disciplines can be approached. The meanings of both
the ‘environment’ and ‘law’ are complex and varied and subject to
contestations of a jurisprudential nature. The divide between doctrinal
and sociolegal research, which permeates the whole discipline of law,
shapes the way in which environmental law scholarship is constructed
and the possibilities for interdisciplinary research. This chapter adopts
a sociolegal approach to environmental law. There is no agreed deﬁni-
tion of sociolegal research,4 and its strength possibly lies in its ‘anar-
chic heterogeneity”.5 For example, sociolegal studies range from
empirical studies of law in action under the legal consciousness
umbrella,6 to studies of legal pluralism,7 the latter being an attractive
and complex concept to study multilayered normative orders and
discourses.
Law in action is what legal consciousness scholars have always been
concerned with, focusing on the engagements with law by ordinary
people, often working-class individuals or people at the margin. Many
legal consciousness studies explore experiences and attitudes to power/
domination and resistance in ordinary people’s experiences of law.
Subjective experiences of law recorded by the legal consciousness litera-
ture not only bring law in dialogue with society but also help rethinking
the boundaries of law itself beyond legal texts. Similarly, at the core of
legal pluralism lies an understanding of law as a complex and varied
occurrence. Legal pluralists have opened law to embrace different types
of legal orders, not necessarily tied to the state machinery. A well-known
deﬁnition of legal pluralism is the presence in a social ﬁeld of more than
4 D. R. Harris, ‘The Development of Socio-Legal Studies in the United Kingdom’ (1983) 3
Legal Studies 315; William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from
a Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
5 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal
Studies’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 632, 632.
6 Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law. Stories from Everyday Life.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). On environmental law scholarship, see
Simon Halliday & Bronwen Morgan, ‘I Fought the Law and the Law Won? Legal
Consciousness and the Critical Imagination’ 66 Current Legal Problems 1.
7 See, for example, Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review
869; Simon A. Roberts, ‘After Government? On Representing Law without the State’
(2005) 68 Modern Law Review 1; Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory
and the Space for Legal Pluralism (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
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one legal order.8 According to Grifﬁth, the ‘myth’ of legal centralism has
been an obstacle to developing analyses of tribal law or religious law, as
they did not deserve to be called law. Against this Western ethnocentr-
ism, legal pluralism ﬂourished to recover those normative orders left
silenced and described their interactions with more formal orders. More
recent legal pluralist scholarship, such as the work of the De Sousa
Santos, has described more complex power relationships between legal
orders showing the hybridisation between legal spheres. For De Sousa
Santos, ‘legal pluralism is the key concept in a postmodern view of law . . .
we live in a time of porous legality or of legal porosity, of multiple
networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespas-
sing. Our legal life is constituted by an intersection of different legal
orders, that is, by interlegality.’9 Such legal porosity and complexity are
not conﬁned to postcolonial societies as they also shapeWestern contexts
and operate at different jurisdictional scales. Adopting a legal pluralist
perspective enables environmental law scholarship to explore through
empirical studies the multiple meaning of law in social-ecological sys-
tems and requires scholars to engage with a variety of legal and other
cultures participating in the shaping of environmental regulation.
Despite the many variants of legal consciousness and legal pluralism
and the existence of other sociolegal approaches, at its minimum
common denominator, it can be argued that sociolegal research, fol-
lowing Wheeler and Thomas,10 is an academic phenomenon requiring
scholars to study the context in which law operates and to engage with
sociological, historical, political, cultural, economic or other forces,
which force us to rethink legal boundaries. Sociolegal research is
therefore inherently interdisciplinary. It is not by chance that socio-
legal research in environmental law scholarship is carried out by
academic alliances between lawyers, sociologists, political scientists,
human geographers and anthropologists, among others.11 However,
8 John Grifﬁth, ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and
Unofﬁcial Law 129.
9 Bonaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in
the Paradigmatic Transition (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002), p. 437.
10 Sally Wheeler & P. A. Thomas, Socio-Legal Studies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000).
11 Anne Grifﬁths, Franz von Benda-Beckmann & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann,
Spatializing Law: An Anthropological Geography of Law in Society (Farnham: Ashgate,
2009); Margherita Pieraccini & Emma Cardwell, ‘Divergent Perceptions of New Marine
Protected Areas: Comparing Legal Consciousness in Scilly and Barra, UK’ (2015) 119
Ocean and Coastal Management 21; L. C. Natarajan et al., ‘Navigating the Participatory
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the interdisciplinarity of sociolegal studies is very much conﬁned
within the social sciences.12
What happens when such sociolegal environmental research attempts
to move beyond the boundaries of the social sciences and encounters the
natural sciences? To what extent can environmental sociolegal scholars
research and write with natural scientists? These are the key questions
this chapter focuses on. Environmental sociolegal scholarship cannot
ignore the natural sciences as the majority of environmental law as
a ﬁeld depends on it or more precisely on scientiﬁc constructions of
what the environment and its sustainable thresholds are. Environmental
law’s engagement with natural science is unique compared to other law
disciplines and has contributed to the shaping of this area of law as
extensively discussed in the environmental legal literature,13 less,
I argue, to the shaping of legal scholarship to date. This is because of
various constraints that can be subsumed under two main pillars: the
institutional and the epistemological.
Institutionally, I will focus speciﬁcally on what has been termed the
‘audit culture’14 in which universities are immersed. A consideration of
the United Kingdom Research Excellence Framework (REF) will be
provided. There are plenty of academic critiques regarding the rise of
the neo-liberal university and providing a critical account of the REF.15
It is not the intention here to reproduce such critiques. The REF will be
explored to the extent to which it facilitates or hinders the possibility for
interdisciplinary research between environmental sociolegal scholars and
natural scientists. Before moving to the epistemological constraints,
I intend to discuss also another type of institutional challenge that
Processes of Renewable Energy Infrastructure Regulation: A “Local Participant
Perspective” on the NSIPs Regime in England and Wales’ Energy Policy (forthcoming).
12 Notable exceptions exist. For a recent example, see Bettina Lange et al., ‘A Framework for
a Joint Hydro-Meteorological-Social Analysis of Drought’ (2017) 578 Science of the Total
Environment 297.
13 See, for example, Dan Tarlock, ‘Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?’ (1996) 7 Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum 193; Dan Tarlock, ‘Who Owns Science?’ (2002) 10
Pennsylvania State Environmental Law Review 135; John McEldowney &
Sharron McEldowney, ‘Science and Environmental Law: Collaboration across the
Double Helix’ (2011) 13 Environmental Law Review 169.
14 Marilyn Strathern (ed.), Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics
and the Academy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000).
15 See, for example, Sheila Slaughter & Gary Rhoades, ‘The Neo-Liberal University’ (2000) 6
New Labor Forum 73; Susan Wright & Cris Shore (eds.), Death of the Public University?
Uncertain Futures for Higher Education in the Knowledge Economy (Berghahn Books,
2017); Stefan Collini, Speaking of Universities (Verso, 2017).
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concerns early-career researchers. This is the rise of doctoral training
centres, which are recent cross-institutional centres to fund doctoral
researchers and offer interdisciplinary pathways and cross-council
scholarships.
Even in an ideal world in which all institutional constraints are over-
come, the collaboration between natural scientists and sociolegal envir-
onmental scholars may still be a difﬁcult one due to epistemological
differences between science and law. To explore the epistemological
boundaries will require a brief excursus into the philosophy of science
and the demystiﬁcation of the positivist paradigm by sociologists of
scientiﬁc knowledge. Many of the critiques that will be presented here
draw on the literature of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Such
literature proves useful in both tackling the institutional and epistemo-
logical challenges and showing the connections between them. Indeed,
STS have critically investigated the rise of entrepreneurialism as the
organising principle of academia16 and the introduction and effects of
audit and assessment procedures on researchers’ subjectivities, careers
and publication practices.17 At the same time, STS scholars have proble-
matised the notion that scientiﬁc knowledge is distinct from other types
of knowledge. Although my institutional analysis is based on examples
from UK universities, the epistemological challenges that will be dis-
cussed are of a wider relevance as they focus on the relationship between
environmental law scholarship and other forms of knowledge.
2 Institutional Constraints
2.1 Audit Cultures
‘[E]very established order tends to produce . . . the naturalization of its own
arbitrariness.’18
UK academics are immersed in a pervasive ‘audit culture’. Audit Cultures
is the title of a book edited by the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern in
2000.19 The book has many contributions from scholars critically
16 Sheila Slaughter & Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the
Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
17 For example, Strathern, Audit Cultures; Angela Brew & Lisa Lucas, Academic Research
and Researchers (Society for Research into Higher Education and the Open University
Press, 2009).
18 Paul Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press,
1977), p. 164.
19 Strathern, Audit Cultures.
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reﬂecting on the auditing practices primarily in their academic environ-
ments. As Strathern argues, audits permeating public institutions such as
universities are more than practices concerning ‘style and presentation’
as they become part of ‘the general fabric of human interchange’;20 they
are a cultural movement becoming a central organising principle of
society in particular contexts and creating new auditable individuals
participating in rituals of veriﬁcation.
Building on Power’s The Audit Explosion,21 audits are more than just
a quantitative neutral technique for improving the accountability and
efﬁciency of an organisation. Audits spread a culture of administrative
control and contribute to the making of knowledge and auditees by
articulating values and frameworks under which the subjects of audits
can move. Audits therefore are active. In the words of Power, ‘audit
actively constructs the context in which it operates . . . audits do not
passively monitor auditee performance but shape the standards of this
performance in crucial ways.’22 They construct deﬁnitions of quality and
performance as much as monitoring them. Self-reﬂexivity is encouraged
by the audits but within ﬁxed parameters and frameworks. Hence audits
signiﬁcantly shape the production of knowledge and scholarship and,
I will argue later, in how far environmental sociolegal scholars can push
the boundaries of their research. I will make this argument by reference
to the quintessential example of auditing in UK universities, the REF.
The REF plays a major role in the allocation of resources and in giving
visibility and credibility to the institutions and their individual depart-
ments. The REF was ﬁrst carried out in 2014, replacing the previous
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The ﬁrst of such auditing exercises
dates back to 1986, the time of Margaret Thatcher’s government. It was
conceived as a means to decide the allocation of funding at a time of
austerity. Several reﬁnements and amendments to the exercise over time
relate to what to grade, how to grade and who could participate.23
20 Ibid. p. 4.
21 Michael Power, The Audit Explosion (New York: Demos, 1994).
22 Ibid. 7.
23 For a review of the history, please see Kate Williams & Jonathan Grant, ‘A Comparative
Review of How the Policy and Procedures to Assess Research Impact Evolved in Australia
and the UK’ (2018) Research Evaluation (forthcoming); John Brennan & Soﬁa Branco
Sousa, ‘UK Research Excellence Framework and the Transformation of Research
Production’ in Christine Musselin and Pedro Teixeira (eds.), Reforming Higher
Education. Higher Education Dynamics (New York: Springer, 2013); Ben Martin,
‘The Research Excellence Framework and the “Impact Agenda”: Are We Creating
a Frankenstein Monster?’ (2013) 20 Research Evaluation 247.
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The key criteria for assessing outputs in the REF 2014 were originality,
signiﬁcance and rigour, and it is expected that they will be used in the
REF 2021. Originality referred to the innovative character of the output
such as engagement with new/complex problems and developing inno-
vative research methods and methodologies. Signiﬁcance referred to the
development of the intellectual agenda, which may be theoretical, meth-
odological, substantive. Finally, rigour referred to the intellectual preci-
sion, robustness and appropriateness of the output.
It is useful to note that in the REF 2014, the scope of research that could
be submitted to the law sub-panel was widely constructed comprising ‘all
doctrinal, theoretical, empirical, comparative, critical, theoretical, histor-
ical or other studies of law and legal phenomena including criminology
and sociolegal studies’.24 Saliently, it was stated that research in lawmight
intersect and draw upon a variety of disciplines and methodologies. This
encompassing understanding of legal research clearly opened spaces for
interdisciplinary research, at least within the social sciences.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the Stern Review in 2016,25 despite the
growing importance of interdisciplinary research, often required by grant
calls to address global challenges, the disciplinary ‘silos’ in the Unit of
Assessment panel structure were perceived as discouraging such work.
Thus, many departments adopted a risk-adverse strategy by not submit-
ting as many interdisciplinary outputs as available. The Stern Review
recommended the placing of more emphasis on and providing more
guidance to the panels to recognise interdisciplinary work through the
appointment of interdisciplinary ‘champions’ on the sub-panels with
interdisciplinary expertise and to introduce interdisciplinarity also in
the environment element of the REF 2021.
To address such calls for further developing interdisciplinary research,
an Interdisciplinary Research Advisory Panel (IDAP) has been estab-
lished to advise the REF team, REF panel chairs and the UK funding
bodies on the approach for submitting and assessing interdisciplinary
outputs in the new REF 2021. Following the IDAP’s advice, the REF 2021
will have in each sub-panel at least one appointed interdisciplinary
research adviser to oversee the equitable assessment of interdisciplinary
24 Part 2C Main Panel C Criteria, REF 2014, 60, www.ref.ac.uk/2014/media/ref/content/
pub/panelcriteriaandworkingmethods/01_12_2C.pdf.
25 Building on Success and Learning from Experience: An Independent Review of the
Research Excellence Framework, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy, July 2016, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/ﬁle/541338/ind-16–9-ref-stern-review.pdf.
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research. Interdisciplinarity will also ﬁgure in the environment template
to describe how the submitting unit’s structures support interdisciplinary
research. Finally, the so-called interdisciplinary identiﬁer will be retained
in the submission system as an optional ﬁeld to better identify interdis-
ciplinary research for which the appointedmembers will have oversigh.26
The inclusion of interdisciplinary research advisers on each sub-panel
and of a new interdisciplinarity section in the environment template is
a welcome development, which shows the institutional willingness to
support interdisciplinary work. The extent to which these will make
a difference on the assessment of interdisciplinarity is however unknown.
Decisions regarding who will be appointed in the REF sub-panel to
oversee interdisciplinarity have not been made at the time of writing
and the way in which institutions and departments will complete the
interdisciplinary section of the environment template is also unknown.
Whether these developments will minimise the risk-adverse strategy
permeating REF 2014 leaves a question mark, especially in relation to
outputs bridging natural and social sciences. Indeed, as in the past REF
2014, in the REF 2021 each sup-panel sits within a main panel. Law sits
within Panel C (Social Sciences), whilst, for example, life sciences sit
under Panel A (Medicine, Health and Life Sciences). In REF 2014, the
biological sciences sub-panel admitted outputs that crossed other dis-
ciplines within themain panel but did not refer to research crossing other
main panels.27
Thus, even if REF sup-panels have shown openness towards publica-
tions in non-disciplinary journals in the last REF and the deﬁnition of
legal research as reported earlier is very inclusive and the renewed
emphasis on interdisciplinarity for REF 2021 constitutes a positive sign,
departments may still be adopting a risk-adverse strategy for outputs
crossing natural sciences and social sciences due to lack of explicit
connections in the REF deﬁnitions of research between the ‘macro’
subjects. This may also be due to issues such as journal formatting and
expectations regarding authorship and length of articles that differ
greatly between, in our case, legal research and natural sciences. If co-
authorship is contemplated in law and in the REF sub-panel, the majority
of outputs of legal scholars are often single authored or have at most
a handful of writers. In the natural sciences, long lists of authors appear,
26 See REF 2021, Interdisciplinary Research at www.ref.ac.uk/about/ir/.
27 Part 2D Main Panel Criteria, REF 2014, 21, www.ref.ac.uk/2014/media/ref/content/pub/
panelcriteriaandworkingmethods/01_12_2A.pdf.
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with the ﬁrst and last occupying the key places and the length of pub-
lications tends to be much shorter than in law. Also, formatting of papers
is more rigid in the natural sciences, which often require a standardised
format with headings such as ‘material and methods’ and ‘results’. Such
formatting and length may not work for environmental legal scholarship.
All of this implies that even if co-authorship is possible and interdisci-
plinary research is well regarded in the REF, legal scholars may avoid
submitting for the REF outputs that are the product of intellectual
exchanges with natural scientists for fear of not being equitably assessed.
It may be safer for environmental lawyers to push the disciplinary
boundaries nearer home, engaging with other social scientists given
that sociolegal research is ﬁrmly written into the deﬁnition of legal
research, as discussed earlier.
2.2 Training Interdisciplinary Scholars
The previous section argued that, cumulatively, a particular auditing
culture embodied by the REF, next to different publication styles and
perceptions of scholars and schools, constitutes an apparatus that chal-
lenges the possibility of interdisciplinary research between the natural
and social sciences. This is however at odds with a grant culture that
pushes for creative interdisciplinary research across the sciences.
The Global Research Council has addressed the growing recognition of
funding interdisciplinary research worldwide.28 At the UK level,
Research Councils encourage cross-council collaborations advertising
joint calls to address global sustainability challenges.29 Such collabora-
tions are encouraged at the very early stages of the academic career;
indeed, there are instances in which cross-council funding (for example,
Natural Environment Research Council/Economic and Social Research
Council) is available for PhD students. With the rise of doctoral training
partnerships in the country, interdisciplinary pathways are ﬂourishing.
Most are internal to either the social or natural sciences, for example,
28 ‘Statement of Principles of Interdisciplinarity’, Global Research Council, available at www
.rcuk.ac.uk/documents/documents/GRC2016Interdisciplinarity-pdf/.
29 See, for example, ‘The UK Strategy for the Global Challenges Research Fund’,
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2017 at www.rcuk.ac.uk/docu
ments/documents/global-challenges-research-fund-gcrf-strategy-pdf/. The Global
Challenges Research Fund brings together the UK Research Councils with other funding
bodies including UK Higher Education Funding bodies, the Academy of Medical
Sciences, Royal Society, British Academy, the Royal Academy of Engineering and UK
Space Agency.
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requiring students to have proposals bridging law and geography and
a supervisory team representing the different disciplines. This is of course
positive for environmental sociolegal researchers.
To provide an example within my own institution (University of
Bristol), the Economic and Social Research Council South-West
Doctoral Training Partnership,30 which is a collaboration between the
universities of Bristol, University of the West of England, Bath, Exeter
and Plymouth, hosts among its interdisciplinary pathways one called
Sustainable Futures,31 which attracts, inter alia, law students who are
interested in exploring the interface between law and other social
sciences disciplines in the ﬁeld of sustainability. Such cross-institutional
and cross-disciplinary perspectives have their institutional challenges:
from the funding which is assigned to the school of the ﬁrst supervisor,
to different PhD handbooks in different schools with different reference
styles and methodologies and different requirements for tracking stu-
dents’ performance during the course of the PhD programme. These are
all elements of the audit culture, challenging the development of inter-
disciplinary research.
Those challenges are exacerbated when attempts at cross-council stu-
dentships are made. Once again, speaking from my own experience, in
recent years the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), South-
West Doctoral Training Partnership has provided matching funding for
scholarships with the Natural Environment Research Council Great
Western Four+ Doctoral Training Partnership, a partnership designed
to train earth and natural scientists in Bath, Bristol, Exeter and Cardiff.32
The challenges of such cross-council scholarships are more substantial
than the challenges mentioned earlier within interdisciplinary pathways
such as Sustainable Futures. These begin with different approaches to the
development of research proposals: in the natural sciences, students are
asked to apply to proposals designed by supervisors in advance and they
are assessed on the basis of their ﬁt within that proposal; in the social
sciences, students are asked to develop their own proposals and the
choice of whom to fund heavily relies on the academic quality and
feasibility of the proposal. This implies that when cross-council student-
ships are advertised, a choice between the social or the natural science
30 See South West Doctoral Training Partnership, www.swdtp.ac.uk/.
31 See ‘Sustainable Futures’, South West Doctoral Training Partnership, www.swdtp.ac.uk
/home-page-2/prospectivestudents/pathway-information/sustainable-futures/.
32 See NERC Great Western Four+ Doctoral Training Partnership, https://nercgw4plus.ac
.uk/.
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approach needs to be made by the governance bodies of the doctoral
training partnerships. Applicants trained in natural sciences may ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to develop their own proposals from scratch, and applicants
from the social sciences may ﬁnd applying to an already existing proposal
intellectually constraining. Second, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd students who
have been trained in both natural and social sciences and therefore
capable of excellent performance in both elements of the PhD research:
undergraduate and masters degree programmes generally sit within
either social or natural sciences.
The example of doctoral training centres shows how the institutional
constrains of bridging natural and social sciences explored earlier in the
context of the REF examples are also present from the early stages of an
academic career. However, if we, as environmental sociolegal scholars,
are serious about engaging with the environment, rather than only with
rules regarding the environment, it is essential that a radical shift in the
organisational structure of universities, beginning from teaching up to
research auditing exercises, occurs to facilitate interdisciplinary research
encounters. For example, more interdisciplinary teaching programmes at
the undergraduate and postgraduate levels could be developed. If this
already occurs in certain subjects crossing the human and physical
dimensions of knowledge, such as geography, it is much more challen-
ging for law, which is more inward looking, probably also due to its
vocational nature, which requires the syllabus to cover subjects for
a qualifying law degree. Nevertheless, law school could offer options of
joint honours degrees with natural sciences. As for research audits,
a more explicit consideration of interdisciplinary research among the
macro subjects could be made, as well as the development of clear
guidelines regarding its assessment to incentivise such types of outputs.
Provided that the institutional challenges described earlier are over-
come with time, there remains another set of key challenges of an
epistemological nature, which may render improbable solid interdisci-
plinary research between sociolegal scholars and natural scientists.
The next section explores such epistemological differences and in doing
so it asks to what extent these are inherent in the nature of the disciplines
or, at least partially, institutionally constructed and reproduced.
3 Epistemological Challenges
WilhelmWindelband, a neo-Kantian philosopher, made the well-known
distinction between different approaches to knowledge and knowing: the
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idiographic and the nomothetic. Such division is between those studying
values and subjectivities and those concerned with the search for gen-
eralisable laws (nomos) based on systematic empirical observation of
facts. The extent to which this distinction corresponds to that between
positivist natural sciences (the nomothetic) and interpretivist social
sciences (the idiographic) determines the possibility of interdisciplinary
scholarship.
Positivists, arguing that social sciences are also nomothetic, have
questioned such a distinction. Notable in this respect is the early positi-
vist position articulated by Comte, followed by the sociology of
Durkheim based on the argument that social facts should be treated in
the same ways as the objects of scientiﬁc inquiry and also the reﬁnements
of the neo-positivism of the Vienna School in the 1920s, which attempted
to apply the atomistic philosophy of natural sciences to the social sciences
and argued more fundamentally that science is the description of
experience.
Positivists, as is well known, are proponents of the veriﬁability of
knowledge, its neutral (value-free) character and the experimental
method based on observational units. Valid knowledge is produced
independently of ethical or subjective elements. From a positivist
standpoint, the union between natural and social sciences exists on
the basis that all science should be based on the nomothetic
approach. Comte’s thesis on the unity of science indeed implies
that there cannot be a distinction between the natural and social
sciences.
However, the core elements of positivism have been criticised since the
1950s, most famously with Popper’s argument that science proceeds
deductively through the principle of falsiﬁcation (rather than veriﬁca-
tion) or with the Kuhnian concept of paradigm and the importance
assigned to the historical and social contexts that allow revolutions and
new paradigms to emerge.
Positivism has also been strongly rejected by one the one hand, the
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School and, on the other, by Science and
Technologies Studies (STS). I am focussing here on some of the insights
offered by STS because, in critiquing positivism, they, differently from
the traditional position of the Frankfurt scholars,33 question its validity
also in the context of the natural sciences. Their critiques are highly
33 See Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (Abingdon: Routledge, 1977).
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relevant for social-legal environmental law scholarship.34 In doing so, the
STS scholars highlight the societal, historically contextual character of
scientiﬁc knowledge and offer the opportunity to recover epistemological
bridges between the natural and social sciences.
3.1 Beyond Nature and Culture, Beyond Natural Scientists and
Environmental Law Scholars?
Following Jasanoff,35 the STS literature can be divided into two strands:
the ‘constitutive’ and the ‘interactional’. The ﬁrst strand, associated most
predominantly with the work of Latour and fellow Actor-Network-
Theory scholars,36 is more concerned with metaphysical questions
regarding the boundaries between the natural and the social.
The second strand, rooted in the Edinburgh school of sociology of
scientiﬁc knowledge, focuses on epistemology, more speciﬁcally ‘knowl-
edge conﬂicts within worlds that have already been demarcated, for
practical purposes, into the natural and the social’.37
Of course, the two strands inform each other and produce over-
lapping critiques. Indeed, in studying science as a social practice, the
‘constitutive’ STS literature has shown how science establishes itself
with a demarcated identity and authority. In Science and Action,38
for example, Latour’s argument is that what distinguishes science
from other regimes is not its rationality but the way in which
science-objects are constructed within particular networks of dis-
courses, materials and practices. These networks in a sense enact
the scientiﬁc, bringing into being what they discover. The STS lit-
erature has demonstrated how the social elements of scientiﬁc
knowledge and how the boundaries between scientiﬁc objects and
social values are blurred in real life. The detachment of the research
object from the observer (the scientist) is put into question in these
studies. To bring another example, Latour and Woolgar’s (1986)
34 It could be argued that they are less useful for doctrinal legal studies, given their legal
positivist underpinning.
35 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order
(Abingdon: Routledge 2004).
36 Bruno Latour,We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1993); Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1995).
37 Jasanoff, States of Knowledge, p. 19.
38 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
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classical study of the daily practices of scientists working at
a neuroendocrinology laboratory at the Salk Institute of Biological
Sciences showed that positivist analyses of rationality, of evidence, of
truth were not overly relevant to understanding the production of
scientiﬁc knowledge.39
The ‘interactional’ approach focuses even more explicitly on
knowledge conﬂicts, and its insights are very relevant for thinking
about possible bridges between sociolegal environmental scholarship
and the natural sciences. Shapin and Schaffer make the argument
that claims to reliability and truth are sustained through techniques
of validation, and social practices render scientiﬁc knowledges more
credible than others, deﬁning science and scientists.40 The validation
of science as a distinguished subject is not independent from the
political and the subjective. Similarly, the ‘boundary work’ of Gieryn
shows how particular social, institutional practices and discursive
representations help in demarcating the boundaries of science.
Carving a special place for scientiﬁc disciplines is therefore
a ‘boundary-work’: ‘their [scientists] attribution of selected charac-
teristics to the institution of science (i.e., to its practitioners, meth-
ods, stock of knowledge, value and work organization) for purposes
of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual
activities as “non-science”’.41 Its boundaries are always in the mak-
ing so that scientiﬁc epistemologies are ﬂexible, varying historically,
geographically and politically.
The STS literature has made a strong case against the bounded-
ness of disciplines, showing that they are not closed and homoge-
nous systems but have porous borders.42 Relatedly, they have made
the argument that epistemological clashes are also present within
a particular discipline and therefore disciplines are not necessarily
uniform. As Lowe et al. argue, ‘what holds most disciplines together
is a collective claim to authoritative understanding of certain
39 Bruno Latour & Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
40 Steven Shapin & Simon Shaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985).
41 Thomas F. Gieryn, ‘Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science:
Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists’ (1983) 48 American
Sociological Review 781, 782.
42 Andrew Abbott, Chaos of Disciplines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
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problems or objects and an evolving nexus of institutional
connections’.43
These observations are relevant in at least two respects. First, they
support the dismantling of dichotomies such as the nomothetic vs the
idiographic, the facts vs values, the natural sciences vs the social sciences
showing how natural science itself has a strong subjective element and is
not a-political or a-contextual. Rather than following a positivistic path-
way of the unity of science, STS studies rekindle the social and natural
sciences by showing their ‘co-production’, to use Jasenoff terminology.44
This opens windows of opportunity for collaborative and interdisciplin-
ary research. Second and even more telling, these observations help us
reconnect with the institutional challenges discussed earlier in showing
that institutions themselves, including academia, are a space for bound-
ary demarcation between the disciplines and the fortiﬁcation of their
epistemological differences. Institutionalised ways of characterising
knowledge have an effect on the possibility for interdisciplinary research
between environmental law and natural scientists and in doing so they
foster the perceptions of unsurmountable epistemological differences.
A brief sociological excursus into the history of science shows us that the
way we understand valid and rigorous knowledge has been subject to
change. Academic institutions play a major role in deﬁning knowledge
and its boundaries and in doing so produce the naturalisation of episte-
mological openings or closures. The epistemological issues cannot there-
fore be disentangled from the institutional ones.
Conclusion
Environmental law scholarship is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand,
as a relatively young discipline, it needs to establish ﬁrm borders, ‘dis-
cipline’ itself so as to gain authority by having an agreed set of problems,
theories and methods that are perceived to be rigorous. On the other
hand, because of the nature of its object (the environment) and because
of the spaces in which environmental law is produced (often at the
interface between the legal and the political), environmental law scholar-
ship cannot isolate itself, for its very existence depends on science,
politics and also culture(s) of legal subjects.
43 Philip Lowe & Jeremy Phillipson, ‘Barriers to Research Collaboration Across Disciplines:
Scientiﬁc Paradigms and Institutional Practices’ (2009) 41 Environment and Planning A
1171, 1173.
44 Jasanoff, States of Knowledge.
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The question of interdisciplinarity is indeed not an add-on to environ-
mental law scholarship but inherent in the essence of its subject matter.
If sociolegal scholarship in environmental law is sufﬁciently developed,
with scholars sitting in law schools borrowing insights from sociological
theories, political science, anthropology and human geography, the con-
nections between environmental law scholarship and natural science
scholarship is more embryonic. This is not to say that environmental
law scholars are not engaging with science and technology: from the very
beginning environmental law scholars have studied and questioned the
role of science in the production and reproduction of environmental law.
However, it is science, rather than scientiﬁc disciplines, and environ-
mental law, rather than law scholarship, that are at the core of existing
academic analyses. This chapter has put the question of interdisciplinar-
ity between natural sciences and environmental law scholarship at the
centre, signposting some of the challenges of pushing the boundaries of
environmental law scholarship beyond the social sciences. The discourse
of interdisciplinarity is well established in academic circles and research
councils, and other funding bodies are making efforts to establish cross-
council funding opportunities to tackle complex environmental
problems.45 Following Gibbons et al.46 and Nowotny et al.,47 this can
be characterised as part of a shift from ‘Mode 1’ to ‘Mode 2’ knowledge
production, the latter characterised by research aimed at transcending
disciplinary boundaries and also academic and non-academic interests.48
However, this chapter has argued that there are some key institutional
and epistemological challenges that are interrelated and that should be
taken seriously, prior to concluding that Mode 2 knowledge production
guarantees the possibility for interdisciplinary work between natural
scientists and environmental law scholars.
Perhaps what is more realistic at present is to make a case for multi-
disciplinary rather than interdisciplinary research, so that cooperation hap-
pens without attempts at synthesis or integration given the challenges
identiﬁed. This however accords to what Pedersen has called, a ‘service’
version of interdisciplinarity, which consists in environmental lawyers
45 Lowe & Phillipson, ‘Barriers to Research Collaboration Across Disciplines’.
46 Michael Gibbons et al., The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and
Research in Contemporary Societies (Sage, 1994).
47 Helga Nowotny et al., Re-Thinking Science. Knowledge and the Public in an Age of
Uncertainty (Polity Press, 2001).
48 Notable in this respect is the Impact culture in REF, which is assigned even more weight
in REF 2021.
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contributing ‘to a self-contained piece of scholarship or a research project as
part of a larger endeavour, counting scholars from different backgrounds
amongst its contributors’.49 A multidisciplinary option is epistemologically
less challenging because it does not require scholars to rethink the produc-
tion of knowledge within their ﬁeld. A ‘service’ version however reinforces
the production of disciplinary differences. Even if we accept this very soft
version of interdisciplinarity, we still run against some of the institutional
challenges identiﬁed earlier, such as current auditing mechanisms not so
ready to assess research that crosses the main REF panels. Indeed, the key
message of this chapter is that unless the institutional frameworks are
revised to give serious weight to interdisciplinary scholarship, either service
versions of interdisciplinarity or more ‘interactional’ versions are risky
endeavours.
Bibliography (Cited Academic References)
Abbott A., Chaos of Disciplines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
Barnes B., Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (Abingdon: Routledge, 1977).
Bourdieu P., Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1977).
Brennan J. and Branco Sousa S., ‘UK Research Excellence Framework and the
Transformation of Research Production’, in C. Musselin & P. Teixeira (eds),
Reforming Higher Education. Higher Education Dynamics (New York: Springer,
2013).
Brew A. & Lucas L., Academic Research and Researchers (Society for Research into
Higher Education and the Open University Press, 2009).
Collini S., Speaking of Universities (London: Verso, 2017).
Cotterrell R., ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal
Studies’ (2002) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 632.
de Sousa Santos B., Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the
Paradigmatic Transition (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002).
Engle Merry S., ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869.
Ewick P. & Silbey S. S., The Common Place of Law. Stories from Everyday Life
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
Fisher E. et al., ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about
Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 213.
Gibbons M. et al., The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and
Research in Contemporary Societies (London: Sage, 1994).
49 Pedersen, ‘The Limits of Interdisciplinarity’, 427.
76 margherita pieraccini
Gieryn T. F., ‘Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science:
Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists’ (1983) 48 American
Sociological Review 781, 782.
Grifﬁth J., ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and
Unofﬁcial Law 129.
Grifﬁths A., von Benda-Beckmann F. & von Benda-Beckmann K., Spatializing
Law: An Anthropological Geography of Law in Society (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
Halliday S. &Morgan B., ‘I Fought the Law and the LawWon? Legal Consciousness
and the Critical Imagination’ 66 Current Legal Problems 1.
Harris D. H., ‘The Development of Socio-Legal Studies in the United Kingdom’
(1983) 3 Legal Studies 315.
Jasanoff S., States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2004).
Lange B. et al., ‘A Framework for a Joint Hydro-Meteorological-Social Analysis of
Drought’ 2017 578 Science of the Total Environment 297.
Latour B., Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
Latour B., We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993).
Latour B. & Woolgar S., Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
Lowe P and Phillipson J, ‘Barriers to Research Collaboration Across
Disciplines: Scientiﬁc Paradigms and Institutional Practices’ (2009) 41
Environment and Planning A 1171.
Martin B., ‘The Research Excellence Framework and the “Impact Agenda”: Are
We Creating a Frankenstein Monster?’ (2013) 20 Research Evaluation 247.
McEldowney J. &McEldowney S., ‘Science and Environmental Law: Collaboration
across the Double Helix’ (2011) 13 Environmental Law Review 169.
Melissaris E., Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
Natarajan L.C. et al., ‘Navigating the Participatory Processes of Renewable Energy
Infrastructure Regulation: A “Local Participant Perspective” on the NSIPs
Regime in England and Wales’ (2918) 114 Energy Policy 201.
Nowotny H. et al., Re-Thinking Science. Knowledge and the Public in an Age of
Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
Owen D. & Noblet C., ‘Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law’ (2015)
41 Ecology Law Quarterly 887.
Pedersen O. ‘Modest Pragmatic Lessons for a Diverse and Incoherent
Environmental Law’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 103.
Pedersen O. ‘The Limits of Interdisciplinarity and the Practice of Environmental
Law Scholarship’ (2014) 26 Journal of Environmental Law 423.
(un)making the boundaries 77
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos A. & Brooks V. (eds.), Research Methods in
Environmental Law: A Handbook (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017).
Pickering A., The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995).
Pieraccini M. & Cardwell E., ‘Divergent Perceptions of New Marine Protected
Areas: Comparing Legal Consciousness in Scilly and Barra, UK’ (2015) 119
Ocean and Coastal Management 21.
Power M., The Audit Explosion (New York: Demos, 1994).
Roberts S. A., ‘After Government? On Representing Law without the State’ (2005)
68 Modern Law Review 1.
Shapin S. & Shaffer S., Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985).
Slaughter S. & Leslie L., Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the
Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1998).
Slaughter S. & Rhoades G., ‘The Neo-Liberal University’ (2000) 6 New Labor
Forum 73.
Strathern M. (ed.), Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability,
Ethics and the Academy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000).
Tarlock D., ‘Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?’ (1996) 7 Duke Environmental
Law & Policy Forum 193.
Tarlock D., ‘WhoOwns Science?’ (2002) 10 Pennsylvania State Environmental Law
Review 135.
Twining W., General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Wheeler S. & Thomas P. A., Socio-Legal Studies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000).
Williams K. & Grant J., ‘A Comparative Review of How the Policy and Procedures
to Assess Research Impact Evolved in Australia and the UK’ (2018) 27 Research
Evaluation 93.
Wright S. & Shore C. (eds.), Death of the Public University? Uncertain Futures for
Higher Education in the Knowledge Economy (New York: Berghahn Books,
2017).
78 margherita pieraccini
